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THE RIGHT TO DIFFERENCE
The Honorable Justice Ron Merkelt
I. INTRODUcTION
One of the most fundamental and least analyzed of all human
rights is the right of individuals to their cultural identity-the right
to be different. In this context, culture embraces religious, ethnic,
cultural and social identification. The right to cultural difference
is the right of individuals to their identity without governmental
interference. In the United States, Justice Brandeis captured the
essence of the right when he stated: "The makers of our constitu-
tion ... conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let
alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most val-
ued by civilized men."'
In the context of international law, the right to cultural differ-
ence has been recognized in many documents, including the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights2 and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.' Specifically, Article 27 of
the ICCPR provides:
In those States in which ethnic, religious, or linguist minori-
ties exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be de-
nied the right, in community with the other members of their
group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their
own religion, or to use their own language.4
The right to difference contains both a negative and a positive
aspect. Justice Brandeis' "right to be let alone" captures the nega-
tive aspect of the right. But the right has also been recognized as
having a positive aspect, particularly in relation to the rights of In-
t Appointed to the Federal Court of Australia in 1996. Prior to that time, he was a
barrister of the Australian Bar. He has worked in the areas of Aboriginal fights, immi-
gration law, and human rights litigation. Judge Merkel has also worked with many
human rights organizations. A shorter version of this paper was presented at Bringing
It Home: Building International Human Rights Law, Advocacy and Culture, A Conference to
Mark the 50th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, held at the City
University of New York School of Law, 1 May-3 May 1998.
1 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
2 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A(III), U.N. Doc. A/810
(1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration].
3 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, en-
tered into force Mar. 23, 1976, entered into force for the U.S. June 8, 1992, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
(1966) [hereinafter ICCPR].
4 Id. at 179.
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digenous peoples and other minority groups. With regard to the
positive aspect of the right to difference, the Human Rights Com-
mittee overseeing the implementation of the ICCPR stated the fol-
lowing in its 1994 General Comment on Article 27:
[C] ulture manifests itself in many forms, including a partic-
ular way of life associated with the use of land resources, espe-
cially in the case of indigenous peoples.... The enjoyment of
those rights may require positive legal [means] of protection
and measures to ensure the effective participation of members
of minority communities in decisions which affect them.5
In this regard, it is appropriate to focus on the right to difference
of Indigenous people, as they best exemplify both the importance
of the right and difficulty in securing it.
Obviously, there are many circumstances where differential
treatment is necessary in order to achieve true equality of outcome.
For example, the International Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination6 developed the broad principle
of non-discrimination on the basis of race.7 This document makes
it clear that distinctions on the basis of race are not forbidden if
they qualify as "special measures" to overcome disadvantage, and
may even be required.'
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIGHT To DIFFERENCE
IN AUSTRALIA
Australia, like the United States, has a tragic history in relation
to its treatment of the Indigenous population. One aspect of that
history has been the lack of understanding of the customary associ-
ation of Indigenous people with their land. This lack of under-
5 General Comment Adopted by the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts.
Comm., 50th Sess. 1314th mtg. 7, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.5 (1994).
6 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimina-
tion, Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force Jan. 4. 1969) [hereinafter Race
Convention]. See W.J.F.M. Van der Wolf, Human Rights: Selected Documents 91
(1994).
7 See Van der Wolf, supra note 6, at 91.
8 See Van der Wolf, supra note 6, at 92. Article 1, § 4 states:
Special measures taken for the sole purpose of securing adequate ad-
vancement of certain racial or ethnic groups or individuals requiring
such protection as may be necessary in order to ensure such groups or
individuals equal enjoyment or exercise of human rights and funda-
mental freedoms shall not be deemed racial discrimination, provided,
however, that such measures do not, as a consequence, lead to the
maintenance of separate rights for different racial groups and that they
shall not be continued after the objectives for which they were taken
have been achieved.
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standing has been central to the disadvantage and alienation
suffered by Aboriginal people in Australia. Recently, it has been
remedied in part by the recognition of customary native title rights
under Australian law.9
In a recent article discussing native title rights,'0 Professor
Garth Nettheim, a Professor of Indigenous Law, at the Indigenous
Law Centre School of Law at the University of New South Wales,
stated:
[T]he relationship of Indigenous peoples to their land is of a
qualitatively different nature from the relationship of non-Indig-
enous peoples to land so that it requires differential treatment
in order to achieve substantive equality of outcome .... The
issue is not solely to do with principles of non-discrimination. It
relates to equality rights generally, and, to the specific rights of
ethnic minorities and Indigenous peoples. True equality re-
quires measures (a) to ensure that members of racial minorities
are placed in every respect on a footing of perfect equality with
other citizens and (b) to ensure for the minority means for the
preservation of their particular characteristics and traditions.
This was decided as long ago as 1935 by the Permanent Court of
International Justice in its Advisory Opinion on Minority Schools
in Albania. The need for differential treatment to protect the
basic and distinguishing characteristics of minorities has been
reiterated on a number of subsequent occasions, for example
the judgment ofJudge Tanaka in the 1966 South West Africa Case
in the International Court of Justice."
We can accept as fundamental Article 7 of the Universal Decla-
ration, which mandates that "[a] 11 are equal before the law and are
entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the
law."12 However, as Justice Gaudron of the High Court of Australia
has observed, ensuring equality outside of the area of mathematics
is an infuriatingly elusive concept.' Justice Gaudron made many
important observations, which I will endeavour to summarize.
The content of the law in western democracies has tradition-
ally been determined by the dominant social group. Consequently,
equality has traditionally involved sameness and undifferentiating
9 See Mabo v. Queensland (1992) 175 C.L.R. 1; Native Title Act 1993, ch. 2 (Cth.)
(the NTA) (Austl.).
10 See Garth Nettheim, The International Implications of the Native Title Act Amend-
ments, VOL. 4, 9 INDIGENOUS L. BULL. 12 (1998).
J Id. at 14 & n.3.
12 Van der Wolf, supra note 6, at 32.
13 See Honorable Justice Mary Gaudron, Towards a Jurisprudence of Equality, Ad-
dress to the Bar Readers' Course, Brisbane (July 20, 1994) at 1.
1998]
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treatment, no matter how different the circumstances of the per-
sons concerned. This approach, which is based on the failure to
acknowledge and tolerate difference, can result, and has resulted
in cruel oppression and injustice." By contrast, the Aristotelian
approach deals with equality in the face of existing differences and
allows consideration of those differences according to the particu-
lar difference involved.'5
Justice Gaudron indicated that legal analysis in Australia has to
some extent accepted the idea that, where difference exists, identi-
cal treatment may compound underlying inequality and produce
further injustice.16 Thus, as Justice Gaudron observed, " [T] here
are two aspects to equality. The first requires that artificial and
irrelevant distinctions be put aside; the second requires that dis-
tinctions which are genuine and relevant be brought to account."17
Accordingly, the law and equality involve the recognition of genu-
ine difference and, where it exists, different treatment adapted to
that difference."8 In many respects, the demands for equal justice
by Indigenous people and other minorities, including many wo-
men, are demands for legal recognition and consideration of their
different social, cultural, and economic circumstances.' 9 More-
over, the law must respond to these particular needs, whether as
persons invoking its protection or as persons who must answer to it
for its misdeeds.2 °
One of the great legal challenges facing the judiciary is recog-
nizing, accepting, understanding and adapting to a diverse popula-
tion.2' If the Universal Declaration and other human rights
instruments are to produce real, rather than illusory, equality and
justice for minority groups, these legal challenges must be seriously
addressed. As Justice Gaudron also pointed out, it is much easier
for the law to proceed as though differences do not exist.2 2 Obvi-
ously then, difficulties in this area become greater as societies be-
come more diverse, with people from different ethnic and religious
14 See id. at 12-13.
1-5 See id. at 14-15.
16 See id. at 15.
17 See id. at 16.
18 See Kartinyeri v. Commonwealth (1998) 152 A.L.R. 540, 557-58 (articulating Jus-
tice Gaudron's additional observations in relation to the scope of the Common-
wealth's power to legislate under the "races power" conferred by Section 51 (xxvi) of
the Constitution).
19 See Gaudron, supra note 13, at 17.
2 See Gaudron, supra note 13, at 17.
21 See Gaudron, supra note 13, at 17.
22 See Gaudron, supra note 13, at 17.
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backgrounds with divergent cultural values living together in one
community.
3
The right to cultural difference may transcend many cultures
and indeed, many other rights. For example, in December 1997,
the International Commission of Jurists released its most recent re-
port on human rights abuses in Tibet.24 The Commission con-
cluded that self-determination for the Tibetan people was both
urgent and critical for their future survival as a cultural and reli-
gious group.25 The Dalai Lama, in an interview recorded in the
Commission's report, expressed his very real fear that the destruc-
tion of Tibetan culture in his homeland would render valueless any
ultimate achievement of self-determination and freedom for the
Tibetan people. His fear underscores the reason why the right to
cultural difference and identity for Indigenous people and many
other minority groups might transcend many other rights.
In Australia, the courts defer to the wisdom of Parliament.
Unless expressly stated in the legislation or by necessary implica-
tion, the courts will presume that Parliament did not intend to pass
legislation that would remove fundamental rights and freedomsfrom its purview.26 Yet, international standards have been drawn
upon to influence the development of the common law, 27 and the
interpretation and application of certain rights and freedoms. 28
Furthermore, at present, failure to regard a material treaty obliga-
tion can lead to the vitiation of certain decisions made by govern-
ment authorities or bodies under Commonwealth legislation. 29
Thus, to some extent, the use of international standards and instru-
ments has shaped the present status of Australian law.
III. ABORIGINAL CUSTOMARY BELIEFS
Issues involving the right to difference often arise in unex-
pected ways. I will outline certain recent experiences in Australia
23 See Gaudron, supra note 13, at 18.
24 See Barbara Crossett, Legal Experts' Group Says China Is Clamping Down on Tibetans,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 1997, at A4.
25 See id.
26 See Coco v. The Queen (1994) 179 C.L.R. 427, 436-37.
27 See Mabo 175 C.L.R. at 42; see also Dietrich v. The Queen (1992) 177 C.L.R. 292,
306, 321, 360; Jago v. Dist. Ct. of N.S.W. (1988) 12 N.S.W.L.R. 558, 569.
28 See Theophanous v. The Herald & Weekly Times Ltd. (1994) 182 C.L.R. 104,
159-63.
29 See Minister of State for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v. Teoh (1995) 183
C.L.R. 273, 287-88; see also John W. Perry, At the Intersection-Australian and Interna-
tional Law, 71 AUSTL. LJ. 841, 850-53 (1997) (discussing the Commonwealth govern-
ment's response to Teoh).
19981
NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW
which demonstrate how the legal system, especially in relation to
Indigenous people, has been challenged to provide equal justice in
the context of minority groups' right to difference. The questions
raised by the examples have a poignant significance extending be-
yond Australian shores.
In some Australian Indigenous communities there is a custom-
ary belief that certain spirits endanger Aboriginal children. 30 An
Aborigine was stranded with his child in the Australian bush when
his car broke down on a very dark night. The father heard noises
in the bushes which he believed were made by the Pulyarts: evil
spirits with supernatural powers which sometimes take a child but
are afraid of light and fire. He feared for his child and lit a fire to
protect his child against the spirits but accidentally burnt out a
large area of prime wheat land. The father was charged with un-
lawfully setting fire to land during a period in which a total ban
applied under the Bushfires Act (WA) of 1954.31 Should protect-
ing his child in accordance with custom constitute a defence to the
charge? The judge held that it was not a defence, and sentenced
the father to community service and probation."
An Aboriginal elder is obligated to protect the spiritual well
being of the tribe's children. That well being was perceived to
have been jeopardised by a photographer capturing the "spirit" of
certain children without permission. The elder forcibly removed
the camera from the photographer. Was the assault and property
damage involved in the recovery and exposure of the film an of-
fence? A magistrate ruled that it was not, as he was satisfied that
the conduct was an exercise of a valid claim or right under custom-
ary law.
33
The Aboriginal custom of "pay-back" can require a spearing of
the leg of a violent offender by the victim's family.34 If the of-
fender is unavailable, the pay-back may be against an innocent
member of the offender's family.3 5 Bail was refused for an of-
fender so that he could receive his pay-back while he was awaiting
30 See Maureen Tehan, Customary Title, Heritage Protection, and Property Rights in Aus-
trilia: Emerging Patterns of Land Use in the Post-Mabo Era, VOL. 7, 3 PAC. RiM. L. & POL'Y
J. 765, 771-73 (1998).
31 See Len Moore, The Queen v. Carlton James Winmar: Repelling the Pulyarts-
Cultural Clash and Criminal Responsibility, 46 ABOR. L. BULL. 17 (Oct. 1990).
32 Id.
33 See Nancy Williams & Marcia Langton, The Law of the Land Holds Sway, THE AGE,
Feb. 23, 1998.
34 See Barnes v. The Queen, <http://www.austlii.ed.au/do/disp.pl/au/...emect/
unrep960.h tml?query=title (Barnes)>.
35 See id (citing The Queen v. Jungarai (1981) 9 N.T.R. 30).
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trial for murder. Would the granting of bail have protected an in-
nocent member of his family from grievous bodily harm or make
the court an accessory for causing grievous bodily harm to the
offender?
36
Intellectual property laws confer property rights on individu-
als. In Aboriginal customary law many spiritual and other images
related to land and information relating to natural tribal medicines
are the "property" of the tribe rather than the individual.37 Can
rights conferred under copyright and patent laws vest in the tribal
custodian of such rights under customary law or are they lost so the
"rights" may be exploited by the community at large without rec-
ompense to the tribal owners of the rights? An Indigenous Refer-
ence Group on Cultural and Intellectual Property has recently
prepared draft guidelines for protecting Aboriginal heritage in this
area.38 It remains to be seen whether such rights will be recog-
nized by law.
Lake Mungo is listed as a World Heritage area in the State of
New South Wales, which was the site of Aboriginal ceremonial buri-
als twenty to thirty thousand years ago. The burials are amongst the
earliest known rituals with which there is a spiritual association
with death. As a result of soil erosion caused by Australian pastoral-
ists, this unique record of Australia's Aboriginal past is threatened
with permanent destruction. Invaluable and irreplaceable anthro-
pological research is essential to ensure pride, respect and under-
standing of this extraordinary aspect of Aboriginal heritage for all
Australians. However, according to Aboriginal tribal law and cus-
tom, the diggings necessary to the research can interfere with the
spirits of the ancestors of the local Aboriginal people. Accordingly,
the Aboriginees refused to allow the digging to continue. Is the
digging necessary to protect or enhance heritage or will it destroy
it?
IV. IMPUTING STANDARDS OF NON-INDIGENOUS MINORITIES TO
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES
In a recent decision in the High Court of Australia, Justice
McHugh dissented, and commented on the adoption of the ordi-
36 See Barnes v. The Queen. But see The Queen v. Williams (1976) 14 S.A.S.R. 1, 7
(discussing that the police should recognize the cultural divergences of Aboriginal
people and adjust their treatment of Aboriginals accordingly);Jungarai v. The Queen
(1982) 5 A. Crim. R. 319 (discussing that court's willingness to take into account
customary punishment in sentencing).
37 See Debra Jopson, Culture Clash, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Apr. 20, 1998, at 13.
38 See id.
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nary person standard used in criminal cases.3° He commented on
the injustice of that standard by stating, "Real equality before the
law cannot exist when ethnic or cultural minorities are convicted
or acquitted of murder according to a standard that reflects the
values of the dominant class but does not reflect the values of those
minorities."4"
To use the ordinary man standard as an example, provocation
is a defence to a charge of murder, reducing the murder charge to
a manslaughter charge.4 The generally accepted test is whether
the provocation is such that it is capable of causing an ordinary
person to lose self-control and react in the manner in which the
accused reacted.42 The ordinary person in a multicultural society
is obviously a legal fiction. Provocation often arises from anger,
insults or violent retaliation that in many instances have a signifi-
cant cultural dimension. Should the test be based on the values of
an ordinary person in the dominant group or by reference to those
of the minority class to which the accused belongs, or should the
test be entirely subjective; thereby, acknowledging not just the dif-
ferences attaching to a group, but individual difference.4
The difference in the values of the dominant class and the
minority class is also seen in the debate over body mutilation,
which has formed a part of many cultural traditions. For Jewish
people, male circumcision shortly after birth is carried out in ac-
cordance with religious practice. 44 Body piercing and inscription
have become a popular Western practice involving piercing of
tongues, lips, nostrils, eyebrows, nipples, and genitals. For Indige-
nous people it has included initiation rites involving perforation of
parts of the body, scarring, tattoos, chipping and filing of teeth and
stretching of ear lobes. It is reported that in excess of thirty-five
countries around the world, including twenty-eight African coun-
tries, practice some form of female genital mutilation. 45 Should
the practice be abolished because the dominant class views are dif-
ferent from the views of the minority class?
3q9 See Masciantonio v. The Queen (1995) 183 C.L.R. 58.
40 Id. at 74.
41 See C. E. WEic.ALL & RJ. McKAY, CRIMINAL LAw AND PROCEDURE: N.S.W. § 23, at
46 (6th ed., 1956).
42 See id.
43 See Simon Bronitt & Kumaralingam Amirthalingam, Cultural Blindness: Criminal
Law in Multicultural Australia, Vol. 21, 2 ALTERNATVE LJ. 58 (1996).
44 See Doriane L. Coleman, The Seattle Compromise: Multicultural Sensitivity and Ameri-
canization, 47 DUKE LJ. 717, 759 (1998).
45 See Catherine L. Annas, Irreversible Error: The Power and Prejudice of Female Genital
Mutilation, 12J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'y 325, 327 (1995).
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There has been a strong movement in many Western coun-
tries to outlaw the performance of all forms of female genital muti-
lation by making it an offence to perform any act of female genital
mutilation.4 6 However, it is important to understand the concep-
tual complexities involved in such measures. Does prohibition by
the dominant society of the practice of an ancient cultural tradi-
tion of a people involve a moral judgment of cultural inferiority of
the society that has long practiced it? Or is the appropriate analysis
one that acknowledges that within certain ethnic groups there are
also dominant groups which impose their culture on the group? If
so, the practice of female genital mutilation may reinforce and per-
petuate a dominant patriarchy which continues that tradition to
the exclusion of the voice of women who are thereby excluded
from any choice in relation to its continuance. Irrespective of
views regarding whether a cultural tradition that offends funda-
mental values should be changed by prohibition, prohibition with-
out education is not only offensive, but may fail to achieve its
objective.
An important view on this role of education within the rele-
vant community is to be found in the Joint Statement47 of three
United Nations agencies. The agencies stated:
Even though cultural practices may appear senseless or destruc-
tive from the [personal and cultural] standpoint of others, they
have meaning and fulfill a function for those who practise them.
However, culture is not static: it is in constant flux, adapting and
reforming. People will change their behaviour when they un-
derstand the hazards and indignity of harmful practices and
when they realise that it is possible to give up harmful practices,
without giving up meaningful aspects of their culture.48
It is unacceptable that the international community remain passive
in the name of a distorted vision of multiculturalism. The impor-
tance of change has also been emphasized at the local level: "To
be effective at local and community levels, the imposition of the
universal must be by way of an opening in the culture itself, not by
external imposition on the culture. Therefore, it is of great impor-
tance to nurture cultural rethinking, reinterpretation, and internal
46 See Abbie J. Chessler, Justifying the Unjustifiable: Rite v. Wrong, 45 BuFF. L. REv.
555, 591-93 (1997); Melissa A. Morgan, Female Genital Mutilation: An Issue on the Door-
step of the American Medical Community, 18J. LEGAL MED. 93, 101-10 (1997).
47 Joint Statement by the World Health Organization (WHO), United Nations
Children's Fund (UNICEF), and United Nations Population Fund(UNFPA) on Female
Genital Mutilation, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION (1997).
48 Id. at 1-2.
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dialogue .... 49
V. CONCLUSION
The questions raised by the above examples are not intended
to proffer a view as to how they are to be answered; rather, the
examples challenge the right to cultural difference at the extremes
of that right, because it is only at extremes that the integrity of any
right is tested. Although the examples present somewhat isolated
circumstances, they represent challenges for the jurisprudential
task ahead to ensure that the right to difference is given effect and
substantive content to achieve true rather than nominal equal
justice.
The importance of the present day challenge to the judiciary
cannot be understated. A failure to recognize and protect the
right to cultural difference may dilute the real value of other fun-
damental rights and freedoms with which the Universal Declara-
tion is concerned. Of course, those rights and freedoms form only
part of the municipal law of individual nations when treaty obliga-
tions are implemented in a manner that incorporates them into
municipal law. However, even where incorporation has not yet oc-
curred, treaty obligations in respect of fundamental rights and
freedoms can nevertheless influence the development of munici-
pal law.
Yet, even in the face of international and domestic progress,
challenges still exist in many areas. The Universal Declaration and
other international human rights instruments embody universal
values. However, because they are treaties, incorporation of treaty
obligations into municipal law is a matter of some complexity. In
Australia, only when treaties are enacted do they become part of
the nation's municipal law. The true international judicial chal-
lenge for the future is to ensure that at the national level, to the
extent the law permits, the universal values adopted by the interna-
tional community influence the evolutionary development of legal
values and the law. At the heart of those values, however, will be
the "always-shifting interplay between the valuing of difference and
the quest for sameness. "50
49 Richard Falk, Cultural Foundations for the International Protection of Human Rights,
in HUMAN RIGHTS IN CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTVES: A QUEST FOR CONSENSUS 44, 49
(Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im ed., 1991).
50 Id. at 46.
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